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Net profit flow per country from 1980 to 2009:
The long-term effects of foreign direct
investment
Dirk H. M. Akkermans*
Department of Global Economics and Management, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of
Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands
* d.h.m.akkermans@rug.nl
Abstract
Aim of the paper
The paper aims at describing and explaining net profit flows per country for the period 1980–
2009. Net profit flows result from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock and profit repatria-
tion: inward stock creating a profit outflow and outward FDI stock a profit inflow. Profit flows,
especially ‘normal’ ones are not commonly researched.
Theoretical background
According to world-system theory, countries are part of a system characterised by a core,
semi-periphery and periphery, as shown by network analyses of trade relations. Network
analyses based on ownership relations of TransNational Corporations (TNCs) show that the
top 50 firms that control about 40% of the world economy are almost exclusively located in
core countries. So, we may expect a hierarchy in net profit flows with core countries on top
and the periphery at the bottom. FDI outflows from the core countries especially rose in the
1990s, so we may expect that the difference has grown in time.
Data and results
A dataset on ’net profit flow’ per country is developed. There are diverging developments in
net profit flows since the 1980s, as expected: ever more positive for core countries, negative
and ever lower for semi-peripheral and peripheral countries, in particular from the 1990s
onwards. A fixed effects quantile regression using publicly available data confirms the pre-
diction that peripheral countries share a unique characteristic: their outward investments do
not have a positive influence on net profit flow as is the case with semi-peripheral and core
countries. The most probable explanation is that peripheral outward investments are indi-
rectly owned by firms located in core and semi-peripheral countries, so all peripheral profit
inflows end up in those countries.
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Introduction
Literature shows two opposite views on the effects of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the
economies of host countries. FDI would constitute an inflow of capital, (management) knowl-
edge and technology, and hence would boost economic growth of developing countries in par-
ticular as these countries would suffer from shortages in these areas [1,2]. The empirical
record has supported that notion; however, also negative relationships have been found for
developing countries (e.g. [3–9], pointing at a detrimental effect of FDI. Repatriation of prof-
its–also called ‘drain of wealth’–is among the possible harmful effects of FDI.
The present paper focuses on analysing level and development of net profit in- or outflow
of countries–‘drain of wealth’–in 1980–2009. Profit flows are hardly investigated; illicit–illegal
[10]–capital flows related to tax havens have received most of the attention. We shall investi-
gate the ‘normal’ profit flows, meaning the flows that are officially registered as such and shall
look into a number of factors that might explain them. Second, the paper investigates a large
part of the period of neoliberalism, 1980–2009 [11]. This period witnessed a rise in FDI from
1990 onwards, in particular from developed countries, and changes in the institutional setup
of countries such as liberalisation which might have affected changes in net profit flows
between countries. The third goal is to give the most general picture possible by aiming at
maximum coverage in number of countries.
Drain of wealth – the long-term effects of FDI
The literature on FDI generally states that it might foster economic growth because of two
main reasons: first, FDI means capital import, and second, it might entail a transfer of manage-
ment skills, technology and knowledge to the host economy, e.g. [12]. As FDI normally origi-
nates from developed countries (outward FDI from developing countries is a recent
phenomenon [13]), it has come to be viewed in research and policy as vital for development of
poor countries in particular.
FDI plays a crucial role in Dunning’s Investment Development Path (IDP; [12,14] which
states that “countries tend to go through five phases (from ‘least developed’ to ‘developed’), in
which the propensity of being a net recipient to ultimately becoming a net source of FDI
evolves (..).” ([13], p. 143). It would create a ‘process of structural upgrading driven by inward
and outward FDI’, culminating in ‘growing national competitiveness’ ([13], p. 144). Hence,
“(. . .) countries may use both inward and outward FDI to upgrade the competitiveness of their
indigenous resources and capabilities, thereby promoting dynamic comparative advantage.”
([13], p. 147). In the fifth stage, the now developed country reaches equilibrium between
inward and outward stock.
The IDP notion–and FDI literature–ignore two important aspects: first, most attention
goes to what from the viewpoint of self-interested investors are primarily unintended conse-
quences: economic growth of the host country and technology transfer. Profits constitute the
goal of capitalist production, “The main objective of all foreign investment is to make profits
and to repatriate those profits to the home state.” ([15], p. 206). And profit maximisation and
repatriation do not automatically match with economic growth and/or technology transfer in
the host country. We shall discuss capital import (a) and knowledge and technology transfer
(b) more extensively.
(a) When a foreign firm invests in a host country and then reinvests the profits there
[16,17] a multiplier effect might arise [18,19]. However, when profits are exported or repatri-
ated instead of reinvested–repatriation might start five years after initial investment [20]–the
country loses capital for accumulation and investment, which, if not compensated for by new
FDI or domestic investment, will result in a negative investment multiplier [5,21]. TNCs then
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act as what Ac¸emoglu and Robinson ([22], p. 70) call ’extractive institutions’, ’designed to
extract income and wealth’–although the term is interpreted here as an international process
of wealth distribution and not a national one, as Ac¸emoglu and Robinson intended.
Research shows that the relation between FDI and economic growth is rather tenuous.
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn distinguished between FDI inward flows–new investments creat-
ing new production capacity in a country–and FDI inward stocks–productive capacity already
present. They showed that new investments (FDI inward flows) influence economic growth in
the host country positively, while FDI inward stocks exerted a negative influence ([5], pp. 94–
95)–corroborating the idea of TNCs as extractive institutions. Blonigen and Wang [4] later
found the same negative effect of FDI inward stock.
Later research amended the findings regarding FDI inward flows as the privatisations in
many countries changed the composition of FDI [23]. The positive effect of FDI inflows
depends on whether they constitute new investments; when it concerns the purchase of already
existing productive capacity like mergers and acquisitions–and land purchases [24,25]–eco-
nomic growth is not positively affected (e.g. [23,26–28]).
The link between FDI inflows and economic growth in the host country was further quali-
fied because country-specific conditions appeared to play an important role: the relation is
only positive when the financial system is well-developed [29,30], or the level of education is
sufficiently high [31,32]. Other institutions that have been researched are for instance the pres-
ence of corruption and bureaucratic quality [33].
(b) The difference in technology and productivity between developed and developing coun-
tries is well-known ([13], p. 152; [34,35]); Chang ([36], p. 102) states that the productivity gap
between the poorest and the richest countries has grown substantially since the 19th century
from 2–4 to 1 to 50–60 to 1 in 1999. Since 1980 developed countries have outsourced large parts
of their manufacturing sector to low-wage developing countries: their deindustrialization
meant industrialization of in particular Asian countries [37,38]. Becoming part of Global Value
Chains (GVC) might enable learning [39–42], in particular when people are well educated [31]
([29,43–45]). ‘Spillover’ through horizontal or vertically upward/downward relations became a
major research theme as it could provide opportunities for ‘upgrading’ [46]. Given, however,
that knowledge and technology are strong competitive advantages, developed-country TNCs
will minimise transfer as it would undermine their profitability; knowledge protection is stan-
dard policy [36,47–49]. Developed countries and TNCs press for protection, in particular
through the Trade-Related Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS). Although article 66.2 of the
agreement states that developed countries should stimulate firms and other institutions to trans-
fer technology [50], the article is factually non-mandatory. The situation is succinctly summa-
rised by Bashir: “(. . .) industrialized countries of the world hold 97% of all patents {in 2000 –the
author}. However, 90 per cent of all technology and product patents are owned by multinational
enterprises. On these bases, the developed economies argue that in most of the cases it is not
possible for them to transfer technologies.” ([51], p. 14; see also [52,53]).
The second aspect that is ignored is the presence of power relations in the international econ-
omy. Countries and TNCs are part of an international system which is characterised by vested
interests and power differentials which could–and do–create barriers to development. Theories
that address the structure of this international system, e.g. world-system theory, distinguish
between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ [54,55]. The group of core countries is supposedly well connected
to each other and to the periphery, while countries in the periphery are hypothesized to be iso-
lated from each other and only connected to the core [56–58]. Power resides in the core, which
exploits the periphery, so profits flow from the periphery to the core. The same applies to TNCs.
Network analyses based on trade relations in goods were used to analyse the relations between
countries–see for trade dependencies between different groups of countries: S3 Appendix, in
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percentages. Shareholder ownership between TNCs was used as indicator of influence and con-
trol; the TNC network also provides an indication of the direction of profit flows as shareholders
are entitled to dividend payments. In both cases a core-periphery structure became visible. We
may expect that there is overlap between the two networks as there is a substantial amount of
firm-internal trade [59,60]. Table 1 combines the results of these network analyses [61–64]:
There is a strong match between core countries (well-developed countries like USA, UK,
Netherlands, France etc.) on the one hand and central TNCs on the other: 47 of the 50 are
located in core countries, and 24 in the top core country, the USA. Hence, core countries and
core-based TNCs will thrive (see for the US in particular [65,66]); other countries and firms
will be on the losing side.
Research shows that core governments and TNC managers influence each other and that a
close match between TNC interests and government policies exists (for the US: [67–70]; for
Europe [71–76]). And as development of other countries and firms might endanger the posi-
tion of those of the core, we may expect that the latter will pursue a policy of ‘kicking away the
ladder’ [36], sometimes in the form of full-fledged empire-oriented programmes ([77,78];
Project for a New American Century [79]).
During 1980–2009, the period of neoliberalism, FDI originating from core/developed coun-
tries grew strongly. Stimulated by core FDI flows the period showed a clear push of core govern-
ments and TNCs [80]–and IMF and World Bank [81–83]–to introduce institutional changes that
served profit maximisation: stronger protection of property rights, liberalisation and deregulation
and privatization, often referred to as the Washington Consensus [84,85]. Barriers to capital
mobility were generally lowered, making FDI and profit repatriation easier. Revision of tax rates
and other FDI-friendly measures aimed at boosting profits (e.g. [86–88]). Strengthening property
rights, in particular intellectual property rights (TRIPS provided more protection for investors
and specifically stronger protection for the competitive advantage of core firms, knowledge.
Two developments in this period contributed to the position of core countries and firms: first,
concentration in global industries with leading firms located in the core grew [89,90] which cre-
ated even more opportunities for extraction of income and wealth. Next, many African and
South-American countries suffered deindustrialization, damaging prospects for development
[37,38,91] as deindustrialisation makes ‘upgrading’ and technology transfer virtually impossible
(Chinese imports might be an explanation for deindustrialization, for a case-study see [92]).
Table 1. Centrality and control in the world economy.












(*) Source: Lloyd et al., 2009. World-system positions based on the year 2001. Core equals group 1, semi-
periphery groups 2 and 3. See also Clark & Beckfield, 2009.
(**) Source: Vitali et al., 2011. These 50 firms exert together almost 40% of global control. The community
analysis Vitali & Battiston, 2014 confirms the link between geography and control.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.t001
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As this brief and incomplete overview shows, many elements have been researched regard-
ing the role and effect of FDI in particular in developing countries. However, research into
profit flows leaving (developing) countries received scarce attention, although there are excep-
tions [20,93].Given this background, more insight into profit flows would add to the picture
that is already present.
Several hypotheses can be formulated. Each country will experience both inflow and out-
flow of profits as in principle any country can act as host country (inward) but also as home
country (outward) of foreign investments, the net position over a number of years indicates
whether a country gains from FDI or not. Given the net FDI stock position, we may expect a
hierarchy in the level of net profit flow.
Hypothesis 1: The level of net profit flow will be highest for the core countries, and lowest for
the peripheral countries.
The developments in FDI flows from 1990 onwards suggest that.
Hypothesis 2: Net profit outflow from peripheral and semi-peripheral countries has grown in
the last two decades.
The recently growing amount of outward FDI from developing countries could create a
stronger profit inflow, mitigating the growing outflow. But besides the lack of outward FDI
stock that influences the balance of inward and outward profit flows for developing countries
negatively it is also possible that peripheral countries are drained by their own firms–outward
FDI stock creates a negative profit flow, contrary to outward FDI stock of semi-peripheral and
core countries. After all, Blonigen and Wang [4] showed using interaction effects that the role
of FDI stock differed between developed and developing countries: positive for developed,
negative for developing countries. Possible reasons are for instance that tax havens are concen-
trated in core countries, while war and internal turmoil is concentrated in countries with low
GDP per capita [94], creating reasons to keep the money outside the country. Summarising:
Hypothesis 3: outward FDI stock does not–or: to a lesser extent–contribute to a net profit
inflow when it concerns a peripheral country.
Net profit outflow for peripheral countries, then, might be caused by on the one hand a lack
of outward FDI stock and its use as capital-exporting device on the other.
Materials and methods
Construction of the indicator ’Net Profit Flow’
The indicator ’net profit flows’ developed here is based on money flows as officially registered
in the National Accounts [16]. In their 2002 study Bertocchi and Canova investigated the
‘drain of wealth’ as a consequence of colonialism and defined ’drain’ as ’repatriated profits,
royalties and direct exploitation activities’ ([93], pp. 1852-1853/1857). They used the GNP/
GDP ratio in 1960 as indicator. However, the difference between GNI and GDP contains not
only profits, but also income categories as wages [16]. Therefore, we have to correct the differ-
ence GNI–GDP for net international wage flows. We shall do this by subtracting the net inter-
national wage flows from the GNI-GDP difference, using the series on ‘remittances received
and paid’ to correct for wage flows. The formula used to calculate net profit flow is as follows
The returns of neoliberalism
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(Formula 1):
Net Profit Flowit ¼ GNIit   GDPit   ðRreceivedit   RpaiditÞ Formula 1
where: i = country i
t = year t
R = remittances
Remittances received and paid are from and to 'the rest of the world'.
A plus indicates a net inflow, a minus a net outflow. A real-life example from the data (all
amounts in current dollars and rounded): in the year 2009 Honduras had a GDP of 14.3 billion
(bn), its GNP was 13.8 bn. The GDP-GNP difference is -500 mln. Honduras received wage
remittances in the height of 2.52 bln, and paid an amount of 11.6 mln. Hence, net remittances
were 2.5084 bn. Consequently, net profit flow equals -3.0084 bn. which is about 21% of GDP.
Net Profit Flow (NPF) partly overestimates profit flows as it also contains all interest pay-
ments on debt. However, FDI are partly done in the form of loans that have to be repaid.
These intercompany debt payments are considered to be part of Direct Investment Income
(DII), the official indicator of FDI-based income (“the return on equity and debt investment”;
[95], p. 74; [96], p. 40). Moreover, intercompany debt payments are often profit flows in dis-
guise via Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) in tax havens [97–102]. So, some debt payments
belong to profit flows, but not all debt payments. Hence, one could argue that DII as indicator
is more precise than the one developed above because DII contains only those intercompany
debt payments that stem from FDI.
There are two reasons to stick to the indicator developed. Outside the scope of intercom-
pany debt are debt and interest payments collected by Export Credit Agencies [103–106] that
countries use to pay for imports of goods. According to Eurodad these debts are substantial:
almost 80 percent of debts owed by developing countries to four European stem from export
credits ([107], p. 3; [108,109]). Also, a part of government debt is payment for large (infrastruc-
tural) projects contracted out to TNCs such as Halliburton and Bechtel [110–112]. All these
categories contain a profit element as well. However, there is overestimation here.
As said earlier, this paper does not look at ‘illicit’ flows. The estimates of illicit profit flows
that are available only concern semi-peripheral and peripheral countries. There might be some
overlap between NPF and illicit profit flows because of interest payments, but it depends on
the methodology used for estimating illicit capital flows [113,114].
Second, the present paper aims at maximum coverage in number of countries. A minimum
of 10 observations per country for the period 1980–2009 was defined as threshold for the
’structural net position’ in terms of net profit. That yields effectively 101 countries for the vari-
able net profit flows and 66 for Direct Investment Income (DII), and 47 vs. 38 when ‘financial
crises varieties’ are added to the analysis (model 2)–the latter number even too low for a statis-
tical test of the model. We shall use DII as robustness check–see S1 Appendix.
One last remark: NPF also underestimates profit flows because profits disguised as produc-
tion costs (management fees, costs of intangibles such as brand names [115]) are registered as
‘export of services’ and hence are not counted as profits–they are also absent in DII.
Controls
The controls can be grouped into trade-related factors, financial factors, and institutional and
political factors.
The returns of neoliberalism
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Trade-related factors are openness, foreign investment concentration and level of rents on
total natural resources. Having an open economy–a high level of imports plus exports–will be
accompanied by negative net profit flow. A large part of international trade is realised by
TNCs that will repatriate profits to the core countries, which means that for the majority of
countries openness is connected to loss of profits. Kentor and Boswell ([7], p. 310) showed that
foreign investment concentration had a significant and long-term influence on economic
growth in less developed countries: the higher the level of concentration, the more dependent
the country becomes, and the easier it will be to extract profits. Given the ‘terms of trade’
notion of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis [54,116,117] we expect that concentrating on supply-
ing natural resources and raw materials will still influence net profit flow negatively (see
[118,119] regarding commodity dependence).
Next, we shall investigate two financial factors. High inflation will induce capital flight,
hence net profit outflow. The same is expected of the number of financial crises varieties in a
country: the more financial crises varieties in a country, the higher the net outflow will be [120].
The three institutional factors that we shall look into are first of all financial openness, based
on the idea that more openness makes money flows easier. A negative relationship for semi-
periphery and periphery is the most probable one, while it may be insignificant for core coun-
tries as in- and outflows might be balanced there. Next, one of the most important characteris-
tics in recent decades has proved to be being a tax haven. Being a tax haven will attract profit/
debt flows, hence the relationship will be positive. Lastly, investors demand strong protection of
their property. Consequently, the stronger the protection of property rights, the lower the need
for repatriating profits, hence the higher the net profit flow. Dreher et al. ([121]; related is [122])
showed that membership of international organizations, for instance of the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) of the World Bank, creates trust among
investors which attracts more FDI. And when relatively more FDI is attracted, more profits will
leave the country. Consequently, ICSID membership will lower the net profit flow.
The political system of a country–democracy vs. autocracy–can hardly be connected to eco-
nomic growth, see [123]; none of the three arguments–security of property rights, pressure for
immediate consumption, and autonomy of dictators–can be clearly linked to a political system,
be it theoretically or empirically. However, a number of autocracies in poor countries have
been installed by foreign interventions of countries that want to open the country for investors
[124,125]. Consequently, investors will be attracted to that country, and profit outflow will be
relatively large, exerting a downward pressure on net profit flow.
The final element that we shall look into is the presence of internal chaos in a country. If
an–international or civil–war is fought inside a country, or anarchy exists, profits will generally
be exported and inflow will be impeded, negatively influencing net profit flow.
The model
The estimated model will be as follows:
Net Profit Flowit
¼ b0 þ b1FDIINSTOCKt  1 þ b2FDIOUTSTOCKt  1 þ b3WSPit
þ b4WSP  FDIOUTSTOCKit  1 þ b5OPENNESSit þ b6EXPCONCit
þ b7RENTSit þ b8FINOPENit þ b9INFLATIONit þ b10TAXHAVENit
þ b11ICSIDit þ b12AUTOCRit þ b13INTCHAOSit þ b14FINCRISVARit  1
þ b151990st þ b162000st þ εit
Formula 2
The returns of neoliberalism
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where:
i = country indicator;
t = year indicator;
Net Profit Flow = Net Profit Flow as percentage of GDP;
FDIINSTOCK= FDI inward stock as percentage of GDP;
FDIOUTSTOCK= FDI outward stock as percentage of GDP;
WSP =World-system Periphery (= 1);
OPENNESS = economic openness;
EXPCONC= investment concentration (Herfindahl export);
RENTS= total rents on natural resources;
FINOPEN = financial openness;
INFLATION = inflation;
TAXHAVEN = tax haven (= 1);
INTCHAOS = internal chaos;
ICSID = membership ICSID in force (= 1);
AUTOCR = level of autocracy;
FINCRISVAR = number of financial crises varieties in a country.
Data
Data on the inward and outward FDI stock of countries are supplied by the World Bank. The
data will be accepted as they are. Today, a vast body of literature exists regarding the measure-
ment quality of FDI inward and outward stocks and flows. Two factors are mentioned: the
attraction of FDI by countries and the growing importance of tax havens. Regarding the for-
mer: countries started to attract foreign investors in the 1980s by promising tax reductions,
absence of restrictive regulations, subsidies etc. ([86]; [126] pp.6-8). Domestic investors, how-
ever, wanted the same perks and started what has been coined ’round-tripping’–sending the
money to another country and re-importing it immediately, turning domestic investments
into foreign investments in this way–with all advantages attached. The second factor are the
tax havens–more precisely, secrecy jurisdictions–whose numbers grew in this very period and
who made money-laundering and tax evasion easy, and also stimulated round-tripping (see
[127–131]). The amount of round-tripped FDI can be substantial, the estimate for China is
around 40% [17,132]. BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are often mentioned
when it comes to high levels of round-tripping ([133]; [99], footnote 5). Of course, when FDI
inflows are round-tripped the measurement of FDI stocks is also influenced, as Beugelsdijk
et al. [134] and Haberly & Wojcik [135] have shown. For Austria the amount of round-tripped
instock is known. It appears to be rather small: 0.2% in 2001, 0.9% in 2009 (see http://unctad.
org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx, accessed December 2015).
World-systems group, meaning the classification into core, semi-periphery and periphery, is
measured on the basis of the research of Lloyd et al. [61]. Adding the results of Mahutga [136]
who investigated the period 1965–2000 is not useful as the number of missing values in the net
The returns of neoliberalism
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244 June 27, 2017 8 / 28
profit flow series is very high before 1980. There have been many discussions on the notion of
semi-periphery as an identifiable group of countries [54,137,138]. It consists of former core
countries that lost their centrality and of former peripheral areas becoming stronger amongst
others [55]. Groups 2 and 3 are coded here as belonging to the semi-periphery conforming to
[61].
Foreign investment concentration is proxied by trade partner concentration index for
exports as provided by Babones & Farabee-Siers [139], as a large part of international trade is
firm-internal trade.
Total rents on natural resources as percentage of GDP are the sum of rents of all natural
resources (coal, oil, minerals, forests etc.) a country has. They are calculated “as the difference
between the price of a commodity and the average cost of producing it.” Average cost of pro-
ducing includes a normal return on capital (source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS, accessed at 10-11-2016. See for the method [140] Annex 3.1 and footnote
3, p. 71).
Openness is measured by the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as percent-
age of GDP (source: World Bank).
Financial openness: the Chinn-Ito index (normalized) is used because of its more extensive
coverage of countries and time [141,142]. Inflation is captured by the consumer price index as
provided by the World Bank.
The data on tax havens stem from the Tax Justice Network (TJN), whose database on the
Financial Secrecy Index comprises the year when a country became a tax haven (http://www.
financialsecrecyindex.com/jurisdictions/database, accessed on 2-2-2016). The next variable in
the finance area is the number of financial crises varieties (‘tally’) in a country, as composed by
Reinhart & Rogoff [120].
Security of property rights in the international economy is signalled by membership (in force)
of the ICSID of the World Bank (https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-
Member-States.aspx, accessed on 8-1-2016).
The political system of a country is indicated by the autocracy variable of the Polity IV data-
set. It was decided to use the autocracy variable as it provides a more realistic measurement of
the spectrum of political systems across countries. For instance, recently Gilens & Page [70]
showed that the US is actually ruled by an economic elite, despite the fact that it has the highest
score (10) on the democracy variable in the Polity IV dataset. There is also the mediocre score
of the USA on the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (https://sites.google.com/site/
electoralintegrityproject4/projects/expert-survey-2; [143,144]). Concluding: the actual situa-
tion might be better described in terms of level of autocracy. Periods of foreign ‘interruption’,
indicated by the code -88, were recoded to 10 (= full autocracy).
‘Internal chaos’ is a combination of two variables. The Correlates of War project provided
the series on war periods in a country. Added are those periods that are characterised as ‘inter-
regnum’ or ‘anarchy’, as indicated by the code -77 in the Polity IV dataset [145].
Two dummies indicating the decades of the 1990s and 2000s are added to take period
effects into account and to check whether the developments in those decades have been cap-
tured; the 1980s are the reference period.
For a full account of the variables used and their sources see S2 Appendix.
Method
The analysis will start with a description of results of the main variables, net profit flow and
inward-outward FDI stock per world-system group using graphs. Countries that appeared to
be outliers for their (world-system) category regarding the dependent variable and the FDI
The returns of neoliberalism
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stock variables were removed. It concerns the following 6 countries: Luxembourg, Hong
Kong, Switzerland, Panama and St. Kitts and Nevis; all are generally known tax havens, while
Kiribati is counted as tax haven by Belgium and Portugal.
The residuals did not show the mandatory bell-shaped form as is required in parametric
regression analysis. Main reason is the presence of extreme values which are either related to
country characteristics–e.g. being a tax haven–or related to period–outliers can often be found
in the 2000s. Removing them would create a considerable bias and reduce the value of the
results. Hence, a fixed effects quantile regression was conducted. The method consists of a
two-step estimation [146,147]: first a fixed-effects regression to determine the panel compo-
nent. Next, the quantile regression was done with a dependent variable that is cleaned from
the panel component; the quantile regression used cluster-robust standard errors to account
for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation [148] The Stata do-file can be found in S1 File.
Three percentiles were estimated: 31, 43 and 85 –the means of the world-systems categories on
the dependent variable corresponded with these percentiles.
The lags were based on the procedure suggested by Bellemare et al. [149].
The classification of countries into world-systems groups stems from Lloyd et al. [61]. They
analysed two different years: 1980 and 2001. Hence, it is possible that countries change their
position in the world-system. In the sample under investigation, for instance, China [150],
Spain and the Republic Korea entered the core; they belonged to the semi-periphery before
2001. For a full account of world-system group changes see S4 Appendix. We shall focus on
the constant groups to prevent influences from sample changes; results of the analyses with
changing groups are available on request.
Results and discussion
The calculations yield a series of net profit flow per country. Formally, the sum of net profit
flows over the whole world should be zero. This is not the case which shows that the data are
incomplete.
Table 2 gives an overview of the available data and composition of the sample.
68% of all countries have 10 observations or more. Oceania is least represented in the sam-
ple, while Africa, Europe and South America show a strong presence.
Position and development per world-system group 1980–2009
Fig 1 pictures the position and development of the three world-system groups regarding net
profit flows. All figures were constructed by calculating the unweighted average of country per-
centages per world-system group per year.
Fig 1 shows, first, that there is the difference between core countries on the one hand and
the semi-peripheral and peripheral countries on the other. Core countries mostly show net
profit inflows, while the other two groups consistently have net profit outflows. Second, posi-
tions diverged: after 1990, core countries’ average net profit inflow became higher than in the
previous period. Simultaneously, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries parted ways: they
were on the same level in the 1980s, but the periphery’s net profit outflow worsened substan-
tially after 1990, reaching almost 8% net outflow per year after 2004. The semi-periphery
stayed on a somewhat higher level of 4% net outflow.
The deterioration of the periphery position is mostly caused by debt. Terms of trade wors-
ened in the 1980 and 1990s [151], partly due to a long-term downward development of raw
materials prices on world markets [152]. It led to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative in 1996 (http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-
Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative; [81]). The debt problems also
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caused financial crises in the 1990s and 2000s; we shall test their influence on Net Profit Flows
(NPF) in the quantile regression.
Fig 2 and Fig 3 provide a partial explanation for the developments in net profit flows (NPF).
They depict the two sources of net profit flows: assuming profit repatriation, inward FDI stock
leads to profit outflow and outward FDI stock creates profit inflow. Regarding inward FDI
stock, we find that inward stocks have grown throughout the whole period for all world-system
groups. The year 1990 is again–although somewhat less pronounced–an important year,
Fig 1. Net Profit Flow 1980–2009, base sample. Note–countries that were outliers for their world-system
group (Luxembourg, Switzerland and Kiribati) were excluded. The excluded countries are generally known as
tax havens; Kiribati is counted as tax haven by Portugal and Belgium.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.g001
Table 2. Country overview of Net Profit Flow (#).
Continent #countries (1) 10 observations * (2) constant WS group ** Both (1) and (2) *** Of which:
NPF Core Semi-periphery Periphery
Africa 54 43 41 34 0 4 30
Asia 49 25 36 20 1 9 10
Europe 49 39 40 38 7 20 11
North America 30 18 20 13 1 2 10
South America 12 11 12 11 0 7 4
Oceania 19 9 8 6 0 2 4
Total 213 145 157 122 9 44 69
# For DII see S1 Appendix Direct Investment Income Results
* Countries with 10 observations or more form the sample that will be analysed
** Countries that do not change their world-system group in 2001 (constant groups)
*** Base sample in the analyses (= constant groups and 10 observations or more)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.t002
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Fig 2. FDI inward stock 1980–2009, base sample. Note–countries that were outliers for their group
(Luxembourg, Hong Kong and St. Kitts and Nevis) were excluded. All excluded countries are tax havens.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.g002
Fig 3. FDI outward stock 1980–2009, base sample. Note–countries that were outliers for their group
(Luxembourg, Hong Kong and Panama) were excluded. All excluded countries are tax havens.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.g003
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indicating the start of a relatively fast growth of inward FDI stock. The world-system groups
do not differ much regarding the levels of inward FDI stock. One of the most striking facts is
the development of core countries: starting with the lowest percentage of inward FDI stock of
all world-system groups, they end up having the highest level of inward stock–reflecting the
fact that most FDI of developed countries has flown to other developed countries. The largest
difference between the world-system groups appears to be in the level of outward FDI stock.
Again, we find indications for two periods with turning point 1990; the growth of outward
FDI stock is higher after 1990 in particular for the core countries, probably because of invest-
ment in Eastern European countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall [153]. Contrary to inward
FDI stock, the position of the world-system groups has not changed over time: core countries
show the highest level of outward FDI stock, then the semi-periphery, and lastly the peripheral
countries. The growth of outward FDI stock seems to be the best explanation for the develop-
ment in net profit flows.
Panel analysis
Table 3 below shows the descriptives.
The maximum number of observations is determined by the variable net profit flow; only
the amount of observations of ‘number of financial crises varieties’ is lower, hence we shall add
that variable in a separate model.
The high maximum values of inward and outward stock are related to tax havens. Eco-
nomic dependencies can be very high as shown by the high maximum scores of export concen-
tration and rents on natural resources. However, both mean and standard deviation of these
variables indicate that such high dependencies are not common.
The Spearman correlations–Table 4 below–yield some interesting insights.
A large majority of correlations is low, showing that there is a lot of heterogeneity present
in the data, and that the chance of multicollinearity is low. The correlations in general support
Table 3. Descriptives base sample #.
Variable N Mean Median S.D. Min. Max.
1. Net profit flow (% GDP) 2753 -4.03 -3.02 6.52 -41.52 56.52
2. FDI stock inward (% GDP) 3390 26.56 15.03 44.24 0 616.82
3. FDI stock outward (% GDP) 3403 9.59 0.98 30.08 0 535.02
4. World-system: periphery (= 1) 3467 0.56 1 0.49 0 1
5. Interaction periphery * FDI stock outward 3287 1.99 0 10.93 0 157.91
6. Openness (% GDP) 3453 79.60 69.96 46.36 6.32 432.51
7. Investment concentration (Herfindahl export) 3223 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.93
8. Total rents on natural resources (% GDP) 3549 7.45 0.53 10.97 0 78.61
9. Financial openness (1 = maximum openness) 3308 0.45 0.40 0.36 0 1
10. Inflation 3006 29.66 5.74 301.65 -13.05 11749.64
11. Tax haven (= 1) 3616 0.15 0 0.35 0 1
12. ICSID membership in force (= 1) 3619 0.69 1 0.45 0 1
13. Autocracy level Polity IV (10 = max) 3279 1.96 0 2.86 0 10
14. Number of financial crises varieties (’tally’) 1643 0.98 1 1.19 0 7
15. Internal chaos (= 1) 3278 0.08 0 0.27 0 1
16. 1990s 3802 0.32 0 0.46 0 1
17. 2000s 3802 0.35 0 0.47 0 1
# Variables have not been transformed
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.t003
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Table 4. Spearman correlations (base sample) #.
A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Net profit flow (% GDP)
2. FDI inward stock (% GDP) -0.26
***
3. FDI outward stock (% GDP) 0.13
***
0.43 ***






5. Periphery * FDI stock outward -0.27
***
0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.63 ***
6. Openness (% GDP) -0.16
***





0.07*** -0.26*** 0.39*** 0.22*** 0.18***












9. Financial openness (1 = max.) 0.10
***






















11. Tax haven (= 1) 0.14
***
0.26 *** 0.39 *** -0.20
***
























































0.04 ** -0.06 ** -0.22
***






16. 1990s 0.05 ** -0.15
***













12 13 14 15 16 17
13. Level of autocracy (10 = max) -0.05 **





15. Internal chaos (= 1) -0.11
***
0.11 *** 0.09 ***
16. 1990s -0.02 -0.07
***















#See for base sample Table 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.t004
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the notions specified above: for instance, net profit flow is positively related to FDI outward
stock, and negatively to FDI inward stock. The trade-related variables (rents on natural
resources, openness and investment concentration) are negatively related with net profit flow;
so are the number of financial crises varieties and internal chaos, but rather low. Being a tax
haven is positively related. The level of autocracy and ICSID membership contradict expecta-
tions: the first one by being significant, the second one by being insignificant.
The periphery variable shows a negative correlation with net profit flow; the interaction
effect of peripheryFDI outward stock is negative as well, suggesting that the effect of outward
FDI stock for peripheral countries is negative. Nevertheless, the final conclusion can only be
drawn after the multivariate analysis–see Table 5.
Table 5. Quantile regression results–base sample.
Dependent: net profit flow % GDP
Model 1 Model 2
Percentiles .31 .43 .85 .31 .43 .85
Inward FDI stock $ -.25 *** (.05) -.28 *** (.04) -.16 (.11) -.33***
(.07)
-.36 *** (.04) -.24 ** (.08)
Outward FDI stock $ .63 *** (.06) .64 *** (.08) .66 *** (.10) .64 ***
(.06)
.59 *** (.05) .59 *** (.18)
Periphery (= 1) -.41 ** (.14) -.14
(.17)
.83 *** (.25) -.41 (.38) .06 (.25) .80 * (.33)
Periphery * outward FDI stock $ -.57 *** (.05) -.55 *** (.06) -.81 *** (.08) -.64 *** (.06) -.64 *** (.05) -.79 *** (.15)
Openness -.30 *** (.02) -.27 *** (.02) -.22 *** (.03) -.58 *** (.04) -.55 *** (.02) -.53 *** (.02)
Investment concentration (Herfindahl export) $ -1.53 ** (.63) -1.94 *** (.47) -1.15
(1.68)
-5.57 *** (.91) -5.32 *** (.52) -5.79 *** (.81)
Total rents on natural resources (% GDP) -.10 *** (.00) -.08 *** (.01) -.06 ** (.01) .00
(.01)
.01 (.01) .03 *** (.01)




-1.34 *** (.34) -.85 (.58)
Inflation -.00 *** (.00) -.00 *** (.00) .00 (.00) -.00 *** (.00) -.00 *** (.00) -.00 † (.00)
Tax haven (= 1) 5.76 *** (.23) 5.79 *** (.24) 5.79 *** (.35) 5.47 *** (.33) 5.58 *** (.26) 5.45 *** (.39)
Membership ICSID in force (= 1) -.15 (.17) -.16 (.18) -.10 (.36) -1.20 *** (.25) -1.26 *** (.25) -1.34 *** (.28)
Autocracy (10 = max.) .06 * (.03) .05 (.04) .08 (.07) .13 * (.05) .12 (.07) .10 ** (.03)
Internal chaos (= 1) -.70 ** (.22) -.56 * (.22) -.05 (.36) .29 (.34) .03 (.24) .16 (.34)
Number of financial crises varieties (’tally’) $ -.28 ** (.10) -.21 ** (.07) .00 (.11)
1990s (= 1) -1.12 * (.45) -.99 * (.47) -1.07 (.73) .05 (.51) -.11 (.61) -.47 (.42)
2000s (= 1) -1.18 ** (.38) -.99 * (.50) -2.15 ** (.76) -.07 (1.16) .31 (.67) -.15 * (.60)
Constant -.92 ** (.35) -.88 *
(.40)
-.11 (.56) .54 * (.55) .88 (.73) 1.98 *** (.32)
N obs 1875 1875 1875 1052 1052 1052
N countries 101 101 101 47 47 47






Two-step fixed effects quantile regression with cluster-robust standard errors (in parentheses). Each model has time-fixed effects (years).
$ One-year lag; lags based on [149]
The pattern of results is robust for different setups, see S5 Appendix Robustness
of significance of independent variables.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.t005
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The results regarding inward and outward stock show that, as expected, profit repatriation
dominates the picture, meaning that inward stock depresses net flow and outward stock has a
positive influence. However, there are two exceptions. Outward stock of peripheral countries
appears to contribute to capital drain instead of inflow. The total effect of outward stock for
peripheral countries is close to zero or even slightly negative (adding up the coefficients of the
direct and the interaction effect [154]). A test was done whether there was also a negative inter-
action effect for the semi-periphery. That coefficient was always positive; only the outward
FDI stock of peripheral countries creates profit outflow. The second exception is inward stock
of core countries: although the sign is negative (indicating outflow and repatriation), the coef-
ficient is either insignificant or clearly lower than in the other percentiles, meaning that inward
stock also partly creates capital inflow in core countries. The relatively larger standard errors
support this interpretation.
At the 85th percentile we also find a higher level of the interaction effect at the core level and
a high positive coefficient of the periphery dummy. That is probably the result of the calcula-
tion of NPF: internal turmoil in countries like Chad and the Central African Republic probably
reduces the inflow of wage remittances (or, at least, the registered inflow) creating a net positive
profit flow as outcome.
The trade-related variables (openness, investment concentration and rents on natural
resources) are negative as predicted. Their effects are lowest at the core level (85th percentile),
suggesting that the first two factors in particular are most harmful for periphery and semi-
periphery level. The negative coefficient of ‘rents on natural resources’ shows that being a natu-
ral resources exporter is a drawback, as extensively discussed by the UNCTAD in its series on
commodity dependence ([118,119]), although in the 2000s prices of natural resources went up
due mainly to the strong economic growth of China (see the commodity price indices (metals,
food, agricultural input) at [155]; also [17], p. 135). In the sample of model 2, however, the nat-
ural resources rents are either insignificant or have a positive effect.
Regarding the financial factors, inflation is negative as predicted, but mostly, again, for
the periphery and semi-periphery. Financial crises varieties (model 2) also induce capital
flight, but only for the periphery and semi-periphery, conforming to earlier research of
Reinhart and Rogoff [120]. It seems a good explanation for the negative developments in
the 1990s and 2000s, as the decade dummies become generally insignificant in model 2. The
explanatory power of model 2 is also higher than that of model 1; however, the sample is
rather small.
Institutional variables show a mixed picture. Being a tax haven exerts a consistent positive
influence, and autocracy is positive several times. Financial openness indeed stimulates net
profit outflow, but insignificant for the core. Membership ICSID is negative but its expected
role is only significant in model 2. For internal chaos the opposite is true: relevant in the total
sample–again, not for core countries–but insignificant in model 2.
The results of the analysis with DII as dependent–the robustness check, see S1 Appendix–
shows that results are generally the same. The most conspicuous difference between the analy-
sis of NPF and DII is the role tax havens play: instead of a positive coefficient, we find a nega-
tive one. Apparently, the role tax havens play seems (almost) exclusively directed at profits
disguised as debt and interest payments, for instance through a ‘tax-efficient supply chain’ for
profit repatriation [156], not for profit flows as such. FDI inward stock for core countries
shows the same behaviour as with NPF: it is insignificant, suggesting that inward stock also
generates profit inflow. Another interesting element is that the difference in coefficients
between outward stock and the interaction effect is larger than with the NPF variable; the total
effect of outward stock for the periphery is clearly negative.
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Fig 4. Two two-tier ownership chains matching hypotheses 1–2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.g004
Fig 5. Ownership chain 3: The interaction effect in the periphery.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.g005
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Discussion
Three elements warrant further discussion: the interaction effect peripheryFDI outstock (a),
the periphery definition (b) and lastly the institutional element (c).
(a) The easiest way to explain the results of NPF development and the interaction effect is
to picture FDI stock as stylized ownership chains. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on the follow-
ing idea (Fig 4):
There are 4 firms; firms 2 and 4 are subsidiaries of respectively firms 1 and 3. The NPF of
country B is the sum of outflow through chain 1 (firm 2) and inflow through chain 2 (firm 3).
The interaction effect means that outstock acts as a channel for profit outflow for the
periphery. In Fig 4, profit outflow through outstock might occur if firm 4 in chain 2 is located
in a tax haven. However, that is probably not what the interaction effect reflects as firms in
every world-system group have subsidiaries in tax havens, and the interaction effect was
unique for the periphery. Fig 5 displays the chain that is probably prominent in the periphery
(country B).
In this three-tier chain there is only one beneficiary owner: the top firm, firm 5. FDI out-
stock of firm 6 creates a profit inflow for country B, but firm 6 has to pass on that profit to the
ultimate owner, firm 5. Hence, the more firms like 6 in three-tier chains in a country, the more
outstock it has, and the higher the profit outflow.
Given the commodity-dependence of the periphery (69% of exports for peripheral coun-
tries ([118], p. 14); the candidate industries for such a chain are extractive industries and agri-
culture. The vast majority of dominant firms in the agro-food sector are core country firms,
while in the extractive industries (oil and metals) dominant firms are often also in the semi-
periphery ([157] p.260 ff., 289), suggesting that both core and semi-periphery exploit the
periphery. Fig 6 and Table 6 provide anecdotal evidence using real-life ownership chains in the
periphery (country B), all with profit outflow.
Fig 6. Three chains in the periphery. Sources Chain 1: http://www.glencore.com/who-we-are/about-us/our-
activities-around-the-world/; [158]. Chain 2: [159], https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/#_ga=1.114935552.628152003.
1481791281. Chain 3: http://olamgroup.com/news/incorporation-of-nauvu-investments-pte-ltd/#sthash.
T0GsGgwt.dpbs; [160,161]. Websites accessed November-December 2016. Glencore and Immoriv S.A. are
also present in the Offshore Leaks database.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.g006
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Table 6. Sonangol entities and operational segments.







Sonangol Pesquisa e Producão, S.A.
Sonangol Hidrocarbonetos Internacional, S.A.
Sonaga´s–Sonangol Ga´s Natural, S.A.
Midstream
Sonangol Refinac¸ão S.A.
Sonangol Shipping Holding, Ltd Bahamas 24-4-2007
Sonangol Shipping Angola Ltd Bahamas 20-7-2007
Sonangol Shipping Services Ltd Bahamas 30-7-2007
Sonangol Chartering Services Ltd Bahamas 30-7-2007
Sonangol LNG Shipping Service Ltd # Bahamas 15-8-2007
Sonangol Marine Transportation Ltd Bahamas 30-7-2007
Sonangol Marine Services Inc.
Angola LNG Fleet Management Services LLC
Sonangol Shipping Angola (Luanda) Limitada
Stena Sonangol Suezmax Pool
Sonangol Shipping Girassol Ltd Bahamas 22-1-1999
Sonangol Huila Ltd Bahamas 2-3-2011
Sonangol Shipping Kassanje Ltd Bahamas 10-6-2004
Sonangol Kalandula Ltd Bahamas 2-3-2011
Sonangol Shipping Kizomba Ltd Bahamas 12-4-2000
Sonangol Shipping Luanda Ltd Bahamas 12-4-2000
Sonangol Rangel Ltd Bahamas 2-3-2011
Sonangol Porto Amboim Ltd Bahamas 2-3-2011
Sonangol Shipping Namibe Ltd Bahamas 16-3-2004
Sonangol Cabinda Ltd Bahamas 2-3-2011
Sonangol Etosha Ltd Bahamas 5-11-2009
Sonangol Benguela Ltd Bahamas 5-11-2009




Ngol Cunene (Clyde) Ltd
Sonangol Shipping Ngol Luena Ltd
Sonangol Shipping Ngol Cassai Ltd
Ngol Dande Ltd
Ngol Kwanza Ltd
Cumberland Ltd (Ngol Cubango)
Downstream
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Chain 1 depicts a copper mine in Zambia, controlled by mining TNC Glencore. Chain 2
shows a state-owned oil company in Angola with 22 establishments in the Bahamas; like chain
1, transfer pricing is a possibility, as are loans from the Bahama subsidiaries to the Angolan
parent–the periphery then exploits the periphery here. Chain 3 (firm 6) is supposed to be char-
acteristic for the periphery. Chain 3 is an agricultural chain: SIFCA owns subsidiaries, but is
itself owned by other firms that receive profits from the total network.
(b) Earlier we defined ‘periphery’ as ‘isolates, only connected to the core’. This definition
fits reality quite well as peripheral countries are indeed hardly connected to each other through
trade–see S3 Appendix. Connections between peripheral countries were strengthened when
they started to invest in each other [13]. However, the character of these connections will differ
from those of the core. Core-core relations will probably show a mixture of chain 1 and chain
2 situations per country, but we shall hardly find chain 2 situations with profit inflow in the
periphery. South-South FDI probably expanded chain 3 situations with profit outflow. We
might even question whether the initiative for South-South FDI is taken by TNCs in the
periphery given the fact that TNCs from core countries are generally the ultimate owner. So: is
South-South investment mutual investment of peripheral countries giving opportunities for
development [162], or are peripheral countries still isolates because it is just investment of core
country TNCs enhancing their ‘exploitation efficiency’?
(c) Making profits all over the world requires absence of institutional barriers, be it to capi-
tal inflow, profit repatriation or foreign ownership of domestic firms [163]. The analyses of
both profit variables–NPF and DII–prove the importance of institutions and policy for non-
core countries in particular. The results of the NPF analysis show that financial openness is
only negatively significant for the semi-periphery and the periphery: for them, financial open-
ness creates drain of wealth. The results of the DII analysis point into the same direction.
Although financial openness has a negative significant effect for all world-system groups, the
core is the only group that still ends up with a net profit inflow. The core is able to ‘defend’
itself economically: there are chain 1 situations (outflow), but these are compensated for by
chain 2 and 3 situations (inflow). Both semi-periphery and in particular periphery are not able
to sufficiently defend themselves economically, consequently, their only defence is creating an
institutional structure that corrects their weak economic position.
Conclusion
The present paper investigated ‘net profit flow’ as a consequence of foreign investment stocks
for the period 1980–2009 for three world-system groups: core, semi-periphery and periphery.
Three hypotheses were tested: the presence of a hierarchy in net profit flows from high (core)
Table 6. (Continued)
Entity—segments Offshore leaks database
Jurisdiction Incorporation
Not in annual report as segments:
Sonangol Suezmax Eleven Ltd Bahamas 29-9-2015
Sonangol Suezmax Twelve Ltd Bahamas 29-9-2015
Sonangol Cabotage Shipping Ltd Bahamas 20-9-2007
# In the Panama Papers database it is Sonangol LNG Shipping Services Ltd, slightly different from this entry
Source: [159], p. 80 for entities and operational segments of Sonangol. Only core entities. Sonangol has other subsidiaries, see e.g. p. 85/90. Suezmax
Eleven and Twelve are probably ships. The Offshore Leaks Database is https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/#_ga=1.85113689.137930281.1481842062, accessed
November-December 2016. Sonangol was used as keyword, no country restrictions
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179244.t006
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to low (periphery); growing outflow in the 1990s and 2000s for both semi-periphery and
periphery; and a different role for outward stock for the periphery. All three hypotheses were
confirmed. Net profit inflow grew for core countries, net profit outflow for the semi-periphery
and in particular the periphery. The FDI outstock of the periphery is most probably dominated
by the core; it all resulted in diverging net profit flows for core on the one hand and semi-
periphery and periphery on the other.
All in all, neoliberalism served core countries and TNCs well. To be precise: it served capital
owners in the core well; workers in those countries have not benefited at all [164,165].[156]
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